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Abstract
We consider a model of competitive insurance markets involving both asymmetric information and ambi-
guity about the accident probability. We show that there can exist a full-insurance pooling equilibrium. We
also present an example where an increase in ambiguity leads to a strict Pareto improvement. Higher am-
biguity relaxes high-risks’ incentive compatibility constraint and allows low risks to buy more insurance.
Higher ambiguity also deteriorates low risks’ expected utility from holding an uncertain prospect. If the
former effect dominates, the expected utility of low risks increases and given that high risks’ utility remains
unaffected, the increase in ambiguity implies a strict Pareto improvement.
 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: D82; G22
Keywords: Ambiguity aversion; Asymmetric information; Welfare improvement
1. Introduction
There is a growing body of literature uncovering the negative effects of ambiguity such as:
limited participation and reduced liquidity in the market, adverse effects on risk sharing, uncer-
tainty premium in equilibrium prices of financial assets, market inefficiency (see [1] and [2] for
recent surveys on effects of ambiguity in financial markets). Furthermore, Snow [10] shows that
information which reduces ambiguity has a positive value under symmetric information. The
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intuition behind these results is that individuals dislike ambiguity – a phenomenon that has been
explored extensively in psychological and experimental literature (see [3] and [5] for surveys).
In markets with asymmetric information, however, agents’ welfare may not fall with the de-
gree of ambiguity. An increase in the degree of ambiguity can have a positive effect on the
welfare of a type of agents if this is sufficiently smaller than that of the other type. We extend the
Rothschild and Stiglitz [9] model of competitive insurance markets with asymmetric informa-
tion by introducing ambiguity about the accident probability. Insurees fail to estimate accurately
their own accident probabilities and make decisions based on intervals of possible probabilities
according to the maxmin expected utility of Gilboa and Schmeidler [4].
In this paper we make two points. Firstly, we show that there can exist a full-insurance pooling
equilibrium. Intuitively, ambiguity aversion increases the utility cost of under- or overinsurance.
In particular, if insurees with the lower true accident probability face a sufficiently higher degree
of ambiguity than insurees with higher accident probability, the utility cost of under- or overin-
surance strictly dominates the monetary benefit of the lower per-unit premium. As a result, the
low risks prefer to buy full insurance at a high (pooling) per-unit premium than under- or overin-
surance at a lower per-unit premium. That is, the high degree of ambiguity makes the cost of
separation prohibitively high for the low risks.
Secondly, we present an example where an increase in the degree of ambiguity for both types
of insurees leads to a Pareto improvement. Intuitively, an increase in the degree of ambiguity
faced by the high-risk insurees relaxes their incentive compatibility constraint and allows low
risks to buy more insurance and move closer to full insurance. At the same time, the increased
level of ambiguity for low risks deteriorates their expected utility from holding an uncertain
prospect. If the former effect dominates, the expected utility of low risks increases and given that
the high risks always buy full insurance and so their utility remains unaffected, the increase in
ambiguity implies a Pareto improvement.
2. The model
We consider the basic framework introduced by Rothschild and Stiglitz [9]. There is a contin-
uum of insurees and a single consumption good. All insurees have the same twice continuously
differentiable utility function U : R→ R with U ′ > 0 and U ′′ < 0 and the same wealth level,
W > 0. There are two possible states of nature: good and bad. In the bad state the individual
suffers a gross loss of d ∈ (0,W). There are two types of insurees: high risks (Hs) and low risks
(Ls) which differ in the probability of having the accident: 1 > pH > pL > 0. Let λ ∈ (0,1) be
the fraction of the Ls in the economy and this fraction is common knowledge.
Each insuree may insure himself against the accident by accepting an insurance contract A=
(α1, α2), where α1  0 is the insurance premium and α2  0 is the coverage. We can represent
the insurance contract as A= (wG,wB), where wB =W − d − α1 + α2 and wG =W − α1 are
wealth levels of the insuree in the bad and good states respectively. In this environment, if insuree
of type i knows precisely his own accident probability pi , then his expected utility is2:
EU
(
(wG,wB),pi
)
= piU(wB)+ (1 − pi)U(wG), i =H,L.
We extend the above setting by introducing aversion to ambiguity. We assume that insurees
do not know precisely their accident probabilities. Their beliefs consist of a set of priors about
2 Since insurees of the same type have identical utility, we index them by their types without loss of generality.
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the true probability pi , i =H,L, and this set is described by an interval [pi, p¯i ]. The length of
this interval is the measure of the degree of ambiguity faced by the insuree. We assume that the
true probability pi ∈ [pi, p¯i], i =H,L.3
Insurees have the maxmin expected utility preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler [4]:
MEUi(wG,wB)= min
pi∈[pi ,p¯i ]
EU
(
(wG,wB),pi
)
=
{
EU((wG,wB),pi), wG wB ,
EU((wG,wB), p¯i), wG <wB ,
i =H,L.
That is, for each contract, insurees compute the worst outcome with respect to pi and then
maximize this worst-case utility with respect to (wG,wB). The indifference curve of type i,
MEUIi = {(wG,wB): MEU((wG,wB),pi) = k}, has a kink at the intersection with the full-
insurance locus {(wG,wB): wG = wB} (45◦ line) as its slope (marginal rate of substitution
between incomes in the good and bad states) in the overinsurance region {(wG,wB): wG <wB}
is −(1−p)/p and in the underinsurance region {(wG,wB): wG >wB} it is equal to −(1− p¯)/p¯.
There are S, |S| 2, risk neutral insurance companies involved in Bertrand competition. In-
surers cannot observe the type of insurees but they know λ. They also know the insurees’ utility
function and the probability interval for each type. We assume that insurers are ambiguity neu-
tral.4 They use reference accident probabilities, one for each type, which, for simplicity, coincide
with the true probabilities pi .5 This assumption is justified by the insurers’ capacity to collect
large data sets and obtain accurate estimates of the true probabilities.
The expected profit of an insurer offering contract A= (α1, α2), given this contract is chosen
by type i, is pi(A|i)= α1 −piα2 =wB − W−dpipi +
1−pi
pi
wG. The expected profit of the insurer is
pi(A)=
{
pi(A|i), if contract A is taken by only insuree i,
λpi(A|L)+ (1 − λ)pi(A|H), if contract A is taken by both types.
Insurance companies and insurees play the standard two-stage screening game:
Stage 1: Each insurer s ∈ S simultaneously offers one (but possibly an infinite number of copies)
contract As . Let Σ = {As | s ∈ S} ∈ 2R2+ be the set of contracts offered by insurers.
Stage 2: Each insuree may apply for (at most) one contract from Σ . The choice of an insuree of
type i ∈ {H,L} can be described by a function Ii : 2R
2
+ →R2+ such that Ii(Σ) ∈Σ for any Σ .
We only consider pure-strategy sub-game Perfect Nash equilibria of the above game. A pair
{Σ,Ii(Σ)}, where Σ ⊆ R2+ is a set of contracts offered by insurers and Ii(Σ) is the contract
chosen by an insuree of type i, is an equilibrium if the following conditions hold:
E1. Insurees maximize their maxmin expected utility given the set of contracts Σ offered:
Ii(Σ)= arg maxA∈Σ MEUi(A) for i ∈ {H,L}.
3 We make this assumption to distinguish the effects of ambiguity from over-optimism or over-pessimism.
4 If insurers are ambiguity averse, most of the results are qualitatively similar except two main differences: First,
ambiguity averse insurers charge higher per-unit price (ambiguity premium). Second, if the insurers’ degree of ambiguity
is sufficiently higher than that of insurees, the insurees are not willing to pay the high ambiguity premium the insurers
charge and the market collapses (no trade).
5 Our results would be similar if the reference probabilities are different from the true ones. However, if the reference
probabilities are lower than the true ones, the insurers should have initial capital to fulfill their promises.
554 K. Koufopoulos, R. Kozhan / Journal of Economic Theory 151 (2014) 551–560
Fig. 1. Relative slopes and shapes of insurees’ indifference curves for different degrees of ambiguity faced by the two
types.
E2. No contract in the equilibrium allocation {IH (Σ), IL(Σ)} makes negative expected profit:
pi(A) 0 ∀A ∈ IH (Σ)∪ IL(Σ) (individual rationality constraint).
E3. The equilibrium allocation {IH (Σ), IL(Σ)} is incentive compatible: ∀A ∈ IH (Σ) and ∀B ∈
IL(Σ): MEUL(A) MEUL(B) and MEUH (B) MEUH (A).
E4. No other contract C /∈ IH (Σ)∪IL(Σ) introduced alongside IH (Σ)∪IL(Σ) would increase
insurers’ expected profits: ∀C /∈ IH (Σ)∪ IL(Σ): pi(C) 0.
3. Analysis
We begin by examining how degrees of ambiguity faced by the two types of insurees affect
the relative slopes and shapes of their indifference curves. This is important as relative slopes and
shapes of the indifference curves determine the nature of the equilibrium (pooling or separating).
For simplicity we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. pL <pH .6
There are two cases to consider which are:
Case 1: p¯H < p¯L, (1)
Case 2: p¯L < p¯H . (2)
In Case 1 the indifference curves of the both types intersect twice (single-crossing condi-
tion fails) whereas in Case 2 they cross only once (single-crossing condition is satisfied). Fig. 1
illustrates these cases.
Let (wiG,wiB) := Ii(Σ) denote the contract chosen by insuree of type i in equilibrium.
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium allocation of our game the Hs takes full insurance: wHB =wHG.
Proof. Due to Bertrand competition any equilibrium contract must lie on the corresponding
zero-profit line: pi(A|i) = 0 ∀A ∈ Ii(Σ) and i ∈ {H,L}. Consider an incentive compatible and
zero-profit allocation (contracts AH = (wHG,wHB) and AL = (wLG,wLB) in Fig. 2) where
6 This assumption implies that there cannot exist equilibria where some insurees choose overinsurance.
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Fig. 2. The H-type buys full insurance.
both types of insurees are underinsured: wiG > wiB for i ∈ {H,L}.7 Denote by (w∗G,w
∗
B) the
intersection of the zero-profit line ZPH =
{
(wG,wB): wB =
W−pH d
pH
−
(1−pH )
pH
wG
}
and the in-
difference curve MEUIH which goes through the pointAL = (wLG,wLB) and is described by the
relation (1− p¯H )u(wLG)+ p¯Hu(wLB)= (1− p¯H )u(wG)+ p¯Hu(wB). Conditions E1 and E4 in
the definition of equilibrium imply that (w∗G,w
∗
B)= (wHG,wHB). The slope of the indifference
curve MEUIH at point (wHG,wHB) is smaller in absolute value than its slope at the intersection
with the 45◦ line which, in turn, is smaller in absolute value than the slope of the zero-profit line
ZPH : (1− p¯H )/p¯H < (1−pH )/pH . Therefore, there exists a new contract AD = (wDG,wDB)
such that MEUH (AD) >MEUH (AH ) and wDB < (W −pHd)/pH − (1−pH )wDG/pH . Thus,
a new entrant can offer AD profitably attracting the Hs, so allocation (AH ,AL) cannot be an
equilibrium (as the Ls strictly prefer AL to AD). Thus, we get a contradiction. So, in any equi-
librium the Hs can only buy full insurance. 
Proposition 1. (i) If Ls’ degree of ambiguity is sufficiently higher than that of the Hs so that (1)
is satisfied then the pooling allocation AP = (wP ,wP )= IH (Σ)= IL(Σ) where both types buy
full insurance is the unique sub-game Perfect Nash equilibrium allocation.
(ii) If (2) is satisfied, then there cannot exist a pooling equilibrium. Furthermore, if the pro-
portion λ of the Hs in the population is sufficiently low so that there exists a separating allocation
(AH ,AL) that is not Pareto-dominated by any other feasible allocation, then this separating al-
location is the unique sub-game Perfect Nash equilibrium allocation.
Proof. (i) Let AP = (wP ,wP ) be a contract defined by the intersection of the full-insurance
locus and the pooling zero-profit line {(wG,wB): pi(wG,wB) = 0}. Consider two indifference
curves MEUIL and MEUIH that go through point AP . Since (1 − p¯L)/p¯L < (1 − p¯H )/p¯H
and (1 − pL)/pL > (1 − pH )/pH (by Assumption 1), MEUIL is flatter than MEUIH on
{(wG,wB): wG >wB} and steeper on {(wG,wB): wG <wB}. This implies
7 A similar argument applies if the H-type is offered overinsurance off-the-equilibrium path.
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{
(wG,wB): MEU
(
(wG,wB),pL
)
U(wP )
}
⊂
{
(wG,wB): MEU
(
(wG,wB),pH
)
U(wP )
}
. (3)
Given (3), there exists no allocation which is preferred to AP by the Ls and not by the Hs as
for any A with MEU(A,pL) U(wP ) we have MEU(A,pH ) U(wP ). Moreover, because of
the relation (1− p¯L)/p¯L < (1− pˆ)/pˆ < (1−pL)/pL with pˆ = λpL+ (1− λ)pH , we have that
{
(wG,wB): MEU
(
(wG,wB),pL
)
U
(
wP
)}
⊂
{
(wG,wB): pi(wG,wB) 0
}
,
that is, no insurer can profitably attract the Ls (or both types) which implies that AP is an equi-
librium. Furthermore, according to Lemma 1, in any equilibrium allocation the Hs buy full
insurance which means that in any pooling equilibrium both types buy full insurance. Thus,
according to E2, AP is the unique pooling equilibrium. Finally, (3) implies that a separating
equilibrium cannot exist. Therefore, the pooling allocation AP where both types buy full insur-
ance is the unique sub-game Perfect Nash equilibrium allocation.
(ii) By Lemma 1, in any equilibrium the Hs buy full insurance. Thus, the only candi-
date for a pooling equilibrium is the pooling allocation involving full insurance for both
types. However, condition (2) implies that the indifference curve MEUIL through the candi-
date pooling equilibrium AP = (wP ,wP ) will lie below of the indifference curve MEUIH
in the underinsurance region (since its slope −(1 − p¯L)/p¯L < −(1 − p¯H )/p¯H ) and above
of MEUIH in the overinsurance region by Assumption 1 (see Fig. 3, panel A). That is, the
set Ω1 ≡ {(wG,wB): MEU((wG,wB),pL) < U(wP )} ∩ {(wG,wB): MEU((wG,wB),pH ) >
U(wP )} = ∅ (single-crossing condition holds). Given that AP ∈Ω2 ≡ {(wG,wB): wB < (W −
pLd)/pL − (1−pL)wG/pL} (AP lies below the zero-profit line ZPL corresponding to the Ls),
there exists AD ∈Ω1 ∩Ω2. If an insurer offers the pooling contract AP , a deviant insurer can
profitably attract the Ls by offering the contract AD . Since the contract AD ∈ Ω2, it implies
strictly positive profits for the deviant insurer: pi(AD) = pi(AD|L) > 0. As a result, the con-
tract AP cannot be an equilibrium and therefore no pooling equilibrium can exist.
In order to prove the second part of the statement, define the allocation (AH ,AL) as fol-
lows. Let AH = (wH ,wH ) be the intersection of zero-profit line ZPH with the full-insurance
locus, i.e., wH = W − pHd and let the contract AL = (wLG,wLB) be the intersection of
ZPL with MEUIH = {(wG,wB): MEU((wG,wB),pH ) = U(wH )}. Suppose now that λ is
sufficiently low so that the allocation (AH ,AL) is not Pareto-dominated by any other feasible
allocation. This implies that for any (wG,wB) ∈ MEUIL = {(wG,wB): MEU((wG,wB),pL)=
MEU((wLG,wLB),pL)} we have that wB > (W − pˆd)/pˆ− (1− pˆ)wG/pˆ with pˆ = λpL+ (1−
λ)pH (that is, the indifference curve of the Ls which is going through their separating contractAL
also passes above the pooling zero-profit line PZP , see panel B of Fig. 3). Otherwise, there
would be a contract (wG,wB) ∈ {(wG,wB): MEU((wG,wB),pL) >MEU((wLG,wLB),pL)}∩{
(wG,wB): wB <
W−pˆd
pˆ
−
(1−pˆ)
pˆ
wG
}
Pareto dominating (AH ,AL).
The separating allocation (AH ,AL) is an equilibrium. Indeed, Bertrand competition implies
that in any separating equilibrium each contract must lie on the corresponding zero-profit line.
Given that (AH ,AL) is offered, there is no other zero-profit contract which is preferred to AH
by the Hs. Also, there is no contract below Ls’ zero-profit line which is preferred by the Ls and
not by the Hs. Finally, there is no pooling contract below PZP that is preferred by the Ls to AL.
Therefore, there is no profitable deviation and (AH ,AL) is an equilibrium.
Furthermore, no other separating allocation can be equilibrium. Indeed, the incentive compat-
ibility constraint of the Ls is not binding (the Ls strictly prefer their own contract to Hs’ contract).
K. Koufopoulos, R. Kozhan / Journal of Economic Theory 151 (2014) 551–560 557
Fig. 3. Non-existence of a pooling equilibrium (panel A) and separating equilibrium (panel B) under condition p¯L < p¯H .
Lemma 1 implies that no zero-profit contract but AH (full insurance) can be an equilibrium con-
tract for the Hs. Given that, the Ls will be offered AL and therefore only (AH ,AL) can be an
equilibrium. 
Intuitively, ambiguity aversion increases the utility cost of under- or overinsurance. In partic-
ular, if the Ls face sufficiently higher degree of ambiguity than the Hs, the utility cost of under-
or overinsurance strictly dominates the monetary benefit of the lower per-unit premium. As a
result, the Ls prefer to purchase full insurance at a high (pooling) per-unit premium than under-
or overinsurance at a lower per-unit premium. That is, the high degree of ambiguity makes the
cost of separation prohibitively high for the Ls. In contrast, if the degree of ambiguity faced by
the Ls is not sufficiently higher than that of the Hs, the utility cost of underinsurance is lower
than the monetary benefit of the lower per-unit premium. Hence, the Ls prefer underinsurance to
full insurance and a separating equilibrium arises.
Three points should be made here: First, the pooling equilibrium with full insurance is due to
ambiguity aversion and cannot be obtained in the standard expected utility framework. Second,
failure of the single-crossing condition is necessary but not sufficient for the existence of the
full-insurance pooling equilibrium. The necessary and sufficient condition specifies that the in-
difference curve of the Ls is steeper than that of the Hs in the overinsurance region and flatter in
the underinsurance one. Third, this result does not depend on the maxmin formulation of ambigu-
ity aversion we have adopted in this paper. It can be also achieved under rank-dependent expected
utility model of Quiggin [8], more general variational preferences of Maccheroni et al. [7] and
for some parameter values under the smooth representation of ambiguity aversion of Klibanoff
et al. [6]. In the latter case, it happens when the parameters are such that the indifference curves
of the two types are tangent on the 45◦ line and the transformation functions are such that the in-
difference curve of the Ls lies inside of the Hs. This obtains when the expectations of the accident
probability for two types are the same.
4. Comparative statics: Ambiguity leads to Pareto improvement
Having established the equilibria of our game, we can consider the effect of an increase in
the degree of ambiguity on welfare. Let us consider two situations, where in situation 1 Hs’
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beliefs are represented by the interval [pH , p¯1H ] and Ls’ beliefs are represented by [pL, p¯1L] and
in situation 2 intervals [pH , p¯2H ] and [pL, p¯2L] represent beliefs of Hs and Ls respectively. We
say that there is an increase in the degree of ambiguity for type i if p¯1i < p¯
2
i .
8 The following
proposition demonstrates that an increase in the degree of ambiguity for both types of insurees
can be strictly Pareto improving.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 and the following conditions are satisfied:
p¯1L < p¯
1
H and p¯2L < p¯2H . (4)
Suppose also that λ is sufficiently low so that there exists a separating allocation that is not
Pareto-dominated by any other feasible allocation. Then an increase in the degree of ambiguity
of both types leads to a strict Pareto improvement if and only if
u(w2LG)− u(w
2
HG)
u(w1LG)− u(w
1
HG)
>
1− p¯1L/p¯
1
H
1− p¯2L/p¯
2
H
, (5)
where w1HG = w2HG =W − pBd and w
i
LG, i = 1,2, is the solution of the following equation
u(w1HG)= (1− p¯
i
H )u(w)+ p¯
i
Hu
(
W
pL
− d −
(1−pL)w
pL
)
with respect to the variable w. Otherwise,
the increase in ambiguity of both types leads to a Pareto-inferior equilibrium allocation.
Proof. We start by showing that conditions (4) and (5) are sufficient for a Pareto improve-
ment. To show this, note that according to Proposition 1, condition (4) implies that the
equilibria in situations 1 and 2 are separating. In both cases, the Hs have the same alloca-
tion (w1HG,w
1
HB) which is on the intersection of the 45◦ line and zero-profit line ZPH ={
(wG,wB): wB =
W−pH d
pH
−
(1−pH )
pH
wG
} (see Fig. 4). Therefore, an increase in the degree
of ambiguity does not affect the welfare of Hs. Thus, we have to show that if condition (5)
is satisfied, the Ls are strictly better off. To do this we compare the utility levels of the con-
tracts A1L and A
2
L (see Fig. 4). The Ls utility level in these two allocations are given by
EU1L = (1 − p¯
1
L)u(w
1
LG) + p¯
1
Lu(w
1
LB) and EU
2
L = (1 − p¯
2
L)u(w
2
LG) + p¯
2
Lu(w
2
LB) respec-
tively, where the contract (wiLG,w
i
LB) is the intersection of ZPL and the indifference curve
MEUIjH = {(wG,wB): u(w
j
HG)= (1− p¯
j
H )u(wG)+ p¯
j
Hu(wB)} and for j = 1,2 and hence sat-
isfies the equation u(wjHG)= (1− p¯
j
H )u(w
j
LG)+ p¯
j
Hu
(W−pLd
pL
−
(1−pL)
pL
w
j
LG
)
. The wealth level
w
j
HG =W − pH d is determined as the intersection of ZPH and the full-insurance locus. Hence
EUjL =
(
1− p¯jL
)
u
(
w
j
LG
)
+ p¯
j
Lu
(
w
j
LB
)
=
(
1− p¯jL
)
u
(
w
j
LG
)
+
p¯
j
L
p¯
j
H
(
p¯
j
Hu
(
w
j
LB
))
=
(
1− p¯jL
)
u
(
w
j
LG
)
+
p¯
j
L
p¯
j
H
(
u
(
w
j
HG
)
−
(
1 − p¯jH
)
u
(
w
j
LG
))
= u
(
w
j
HG
)
+
(
1 −
p¯
j
L
p¯
j
H
)(
u
(
w
j
LG
)
− u
(
w
j
HG
))
.
8 Since we concentrate our analysis mainly on the underinsurance region (Assumption 1), changes in the lower bound
of the probability of accident do not affect the welfare analysis (since the worst-case scenario is based on the upper
probability only). Therefore, we assume them to be unchanged to simplify the exposition.
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Fig. 4. An increase in ambiguity leads to a strict Pareto-improvement.
Taking into account that w1HG =w
2
HG and condition (5) we obtain
EU2L − EU
1
L =
(
1 −
p¯2L
p¯2H
)(
u
(
w2LG
)
− u
(
w2HG
))
−
(
1 −
p¯1L
p¯1H
)(
u
(
w1LG
)
− u
(
w1HG
))
> 0.
In situation 2, with a higher degree of ambiguity, the Ls are strictly better off if condition (5)
is satisfied. This proves the sufficiency of the conditions. On the other hand, if (5) does not hold,
a Pareto improvement cannot be achieved. 
An increase in ambiguity has two opposite effects on the utility of the Ls. First, an increase in
ambiguity of the Hs increases Hs’ mimicking cost (because of greater ambiguity) and allows the
Ls to purchase more insurance while still separating themselves from the Hs. That is, the contract
chosen by the Ls in equilibrium lies closer to the 45◦ line and so Ls’ welfare improves everything
else given (see Fig. 4). Second, an increase in Ls’ degree of ambiguity implies a reduction in Ls’
utility at any given contract in the underinsurance region (Ls’ indifference curve becomes flatter).
The final outcome depends on which of these two countervailing forces dominates. If the increase
in ambiguity for the Hs is sufficiently larger than for the Ls, the first effect dominates and so the
increase in ambiguity is welfare improving for the Ls. However, if the increase in ambiguity for
the Ls is substantially larger than for the Hs, the second effect dominates and the Ls experience
a drop in utility.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we develop a model with asymmetric information and present an example where
an increase in ambiguity can result in a strict Pareto improvement. The increase in ambiguity
has two effects: a) It relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint of the Hs. This allows the Ls
to move closer to the first-best allocation and increase their utility. b) Everything else given, the
increase in ambiguity reduces perceived expected utility. If the increase in ambiguity of the Hs
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is sufficiently higher than that of the Ls, the first effect dominates and the increase in ambiguity
leads to an increase of Ls’ expected utility. Also, under certain conditions, the increase in ambi-
guity has no effect on Hs’ welfare. As a result, an increase in ambiguity can lead to a strict Pareto
improvement.
We also show that there can exist a full-insurance pooling equilibrium. This happens when
the Ls face a sufficiently higher degree of ambiguity than the Hs, the utility cost of under- or
overinsurance strictly dominates the monetary benefit of the lower per-unit premium. As a result,
the high degree of ambiguity makes the cost of separation prohibitively high for the Ls.
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